"The "Keynesian Moment" in Policymaking, the Perils Ahead, and a Flow-of-funds Interpretation of Fiscal Policy" by Andrea Terzi
 
 
Working Paper No. 614
 
 
The “Keynesian Moment” in Policymaking, the Perils Ahead, 























The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by 
Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to 
disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals. 
 
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. 
Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy 
responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in 
the United States and abroad. 
 
 
Levy Economics Institute  
P.O. Box 5000 
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000 
http://www.levyinstitute.org 
 





With the global crisis, the policy stance around the world has been shaken by massive 
government and central bank efforts to prevent the meltdown of markets, banks, and the 
economy. Fiscal packages, in varied sizes, have been adopted throughout the world after years of 
proclaimed fiscal containment. This change in policy regime, though dubbed the “Keynesian 
moment,” is a “short-run fix” that reflects temporary acceptance of fiscal deficits at a time of 
political emergency, and contrasts with John Maynard Keynes’s long-run policy propositions. 
More important, it is doomed to be ineffective if the degree of tolerance of fiscal deficits is too 
low for full employment. 
Keynes’s view that outside the gold standard fiscal policies face real, not financial, 
constraints is illustrated by means of a simple flow-of-funds model. This shows that government 
deficits do not take financial resources from the private sector, and that demand for net financial 
savings by the private sector can be met by a rising trade surplus at the cost of reduced 
consumption, or by a rising government deficit financed by the monopoly supply of central bank 
credit. Fiscal deficits can thus be considered functional to the objective of supplying the private 
sector with a provision of financial wealth sufficient to restore demand. By contrast, tax hikes 
and/or spending cuts aimed at reducing the public deficit lower the available savings of the 
private sector, and, if adopted too soon, will force the adjustment by way of a reduction of 
demand and standard of living. 
This notion, however, is not applicable to the euro area, where constraints have been 
deliberately created that limit public deficits and the supply of central bank credit, thus 
introducing national solvency risks. This is a crucial flaw in the institutional structure of 
Euroland, where monetary sovereignty has been removed from all existing fiscal authorities. 
Absent a reassessment of its design, the euro area is facing a deflationary tendency that may 
further erode the economic welfare of the region. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the global crisis, the policy regime around the world has been shaken. The once acclaimed 
pivotal role of monetary policy, widely centered on some form of inflation targeting, has given 
way to massive government and central bank efforts to prevent the meltdown of markets, banks, 
and the economy. Fiscal packages, in varied sizes, have been adopted throughout the world after 
years of proclaimed fiscal deficit containment. Has this marked a “return of Keynesianism”? 
Does this mean that the policy regime that brought the world economy into the crisis is being 
deeply reconsidered?  
 
My answer is summarized in the following two points: 
1)  The alleged “Keynesian moment” in the United States largely builds on a theoretical 
framework where aggregate demand problems develop in the presence of rigidities and 
market imperfections, while demand management policy is a short-term expedient 
justified by the extent and depth of the crisis. As long as this remains the paradigm of 
reference, government policies are considered “short-term fixes” aimed at reversing the 
business cycle, and are to be quickly undone as soon as the economy recovers. This 
prominent approach not only contrasts with Keynes’s policy prescriptions but, more 
importantly, is doomed to be ineffective if the degree of political tolerance for fiscal 
deficits is too low for full employment. 
2)  The sixteen EU countries now sharing the euro accept an institutional structure that 
removes monetary sovereignty from all existing fiscal authorities. This makes them less 
open to “Keynesian moments,” meaning that the degree of tolerance for fiscal deficits is 
even lower than in nations that use their own domestic currency. This has moved the euro 
area, absent a deep political reform of fiscal authorities, on a deflationary, and possibly 
implosive, path. 
 
In order to provide evidence to support these claims, the next three sections of this paper will: 
1)  contrast the short-run character of current emergency policies with the long-run 
properties of policy propositions in Keynes’s economics;  
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2)  discuss the consequences of fiscal actions within a simple flow-of-funds model; and 
3)  detail one crucial flaw in the institutional structure of the euro area. 
 
2.  ONE FISCAL EXPANSION DOES NOT MAKE KEYNES  
 
While discussing the global crisis, this section does not aim to assess “the hows and whys” of the 
crisis that the G20, at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, defined as “the greatest challenge to the 
world economy in our generation.” Rather, it considers one single, unquestionable consequence 
of the disruptions of financial markets and banks: the impairment of the private sector’s balance 
sheets that triggered a collapse of aggregate demand. Although interpretations differ, there is 
broad consensus that a lack of demand caused the global recession. Yet, I contend here that 
action undertaken by most governments in response to the crisis only marginally reflect 
Keynes’s theoretical framework. If policymakers are interested in exploring alternatives to the 
precrisis policy regime, they should explore further. 
 
2.1 The “Keynesian Moment”: Macroeconomics Engineers “Staring into the Abyss” 
In the fall of 2008, a deadly cocktail of freefalling financial and commodity prices, frozen money 
markets, and plunging business orders produced the nightmare of an economy close to 
meltdown. Both independently, as well as through international consultations, governments were 
urgently considering actions aimed to first bringing the economy back from a precipice, and then 
facing the challenge of rebuilding confidence in the market system. In the midst of plunging 
incomes and demand, policymakers were on the front line, seeking effective actions to counter 
the mounting recession.  
In a “sky is falling” climate, the U.S. administration orchestrated a gigantic rescue plan 
for the country’s financial system, and while the U.S. president-elect was drafting the stimulus 
package, a short essay by Greg Mankiw (2008) declared a return to Keynes. Mankiw was calling 
for plain demand management policy, and his message was straightforward: the cause of the 
economic downturn is insufficient aggregate demand; this condition is reversed when some event 
triggers a rise in demand; demand has four components; little is expected to happen to 
consumption, investment, or exports; this leaves the government as the demander of last resort.  
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The eye-opener was that this was been claimed by a Harvard economist who had dismissed the 
label “Keynesian” for having “outlived its usefulness,” (Mankiw 1992) and proclaimed the 
reincarnation of Keynesian economics in a new body of theory, leaving little, if any, room for 
demand management policy. In the New Keynesian view—or, after dismissing the Keynesian 
label, the “new neoclassical synthesis”—monetary policy is not considered effective in the long 
run, while fiscal policy can only be effective in stimulating demand at the cost of bearing on 
future generations. Yet, Mankiw concluded that if monetary policy could not stop the plunge, 
there would only remain Keynes’s “good short-run fix”: a government spending plan. In his 
view, this would only pass the burden of “unfunded promises” to the next generation and thus 
“may look attractive to those without children” (Keynes himself was childless). 
Mankiw’s unenthusiastic recipe was consistent with his views of the dual role of 
“scientists” and “engineers” in macroeconomics. Apparently bewildered by the depth of a crisis 
that he did not believe would spontaneously mend through market adjustment, he was not 
seeking solutions in the “macroeconomic research of the past three decades” that “has had only 
minor impact on the practical analysis of monetary and fiscal policy” (Mankiw 2006: 42). 
Seeking solutions in the “engineering” (rather than the “science”) of macroeconomics, he had 
chosen a realistic demand-side explanation of the crisis and a pragmatic demand-side policy 
response. This entailed the unwelcome necessity of rescuing markets through public debt. To 
most advocates of the Obama fiscal package this was the best, and yet precarious, solution that 
macroeconomic engineers could devise. It seems that the feeling of staring into the abyss was 
pushing the (undefined) limits of debt tolerance a bit further.  
This attitude was largely shared by academics and international organizations, supporting 
fiscal responses while warning of its possible unpleasant consequences. Reviewing the impact of 
crisis-related financial support operations on government balance, the IMF raised the question of 
“how much room does fiscal policy have to continue its supportive action,” and recommends 
governments “balance two opposite risks: The risk of prolonged depression and stagnation… 
[and] the risk of a loss of confidence in government solvency” (IMF 2009: 39–40). Making a 
case for a policy response in sharp contrast with the policy regime conventionally recommended 
in normal times was visibly problematic and adding additional uncertainty: Had demand-
management polices not been discredited? Why should they work now? How long should 
policies be permitted to deviate from the “norm” without undermining future stability? Were  
 
5
governments not miscalculating the undesired consequences? Was there any other credible 
alternative to avoid a prolonged depression? And is this not evidence that capitalism can only 
survive by periodically engaging in policies that endanger its free market foundations, in some 
sort of “Marx moment”? 
The point here is that the precrisis policy regime had no strategy to deal promptly with a 
sudden and major fall of aggregate demand. By the same token, political urgency was not 
leaving much room (and time) to ponder alternatives, as policymakers had to stop the bleeding 
caused by a crisis that had created huge output and job losses. They were compelled to choose 
between a temporary demand management remedy and a possibly lengthy adjustment that may 
be politically intolerable. It is possible that behind closed doors policymakers decided to ignore 
the alleged “sound principles” at a time of political emergency and undertake temporary and 
exceptional measures outside the established paradigm. 
Lack of demand, rescuing markets, and short-run stabilization policies: these are familiar 
Keynesian themes, yet this was primarily a “moment of political emergency,” much more than it 
was a “Keynesian moment” in the sense of a reassessment of the policy regime. The consensus 
was that fiscal discipline should, at least momentarily, be given lower priority, and it was this 
temporary dispensation from ordinary principles that was called “Keynesian.” 
 
2.2 A Set of Policy Prescriptions from Keynes’s General Theory 
John Maynard Keynes’s theoretical approach was not aimed at devising ways to soften cycles 
through “short-run fixes.” While this point is well-known to the Post Keynesian literature, it is 
worth considering concisely the breadth of Keynes’s policy approach and contrasting it with the 
narrow conception of a “Keynesian moment” as an emergency fiscal package seeking to repair 
an anomaly. 
In the General Theory, Keynes developed the thesis that capitalism fluctuates 
consistently below productive capacity. His theoretical construction accounts for what he 
considered  
the outstanding features of our actual experience—namely, that 
we oscillate, avoiding the gravest extremes of fluctuation in 
employment and in prices in both directions, round an 
intermediate position appreciably below full employment and 
appreciably above the minimum employment a decline below 
which would endanger life. (Keynes 1936: 254)  
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The cyclicality of the expected yields from business investment, the rigidity of money 
wages,
1 the limited size of the multiplier, and automatic stabilizers help contain macroeconomic 
fluctuations within “tolerable” bounds. Keynes’s analysis was thus primarily directed at seeking 
ways to let the economy permanently adjust to a higher level of activity: 
 
we must not conclude that the mean position thus determined by 
‘natural’ tendencies, namely, by those tendencies which are 
likely to persist, failing measures expressly designed to correct 
them, is, therefore, established by laws of necessity. The 
unimpeded rule of the above conditions is a fact of observation 
concerning the world as it is or has been, and not a necessary 
principle which cannot be changed. (Keynes 1936: 254) 
 
Ultimately, Keynes’s economics produce policy propositions that cannot be reduced to 
the question of approving emergency fiscal packages. Aiming at economic prosperity, Keynes’s 
policy goal was more ambitious: achieving full employment of existing resources was a way to 
care for the future generations and strengthen the liberal foundations of society. His was the 
opposite of the caricature of a short-run, myopic plan, violating long-run principles, driven by a 
cynical attitude that in the long run we will all be dead. It was about disproving the notion that a 
full employment society is not possible (or not desirable). It was about providing a framework 
for the right set of policy tools that could free the economy of the monetary constraints to full 
employment. 
What follows is a concise summary of Keynes’s main analytical points providing support 
to his long-run policy vision.  
 
On price and wage adjustment mechanisms  
In Keynes’s model, letting prices and wages adjust downwards is not a remedy to restore a 
higher rate of employment and growth for two main reasons: expectations of further declining 
wages prompt a fall in the prospective yield of investment, while falling prices increase debt 
burdens causing insolvencies. While he claims that only a once-for-all wage cut “by decree” 
could have positive effects by creating an expectation of (from now on) rising wages, Keynes 
contends that downward flexible, sagging wages contribute to worsening the business climate.  
                                                             
1 For Keynes, rigid wages help contain, not cause, output fluctuations.  
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Keynes concluded that there is  
 
no ground for the belief that a flexible wage policy is capable of 
maintaining a state of continuous full employment—any more 
than for the belief than an open-market monetary policy is 
capable, unaided, of achieving this result. The economic system 
cannot be made self-adjusting along these lines. (Keynes 1936: 
267)  
 
On the gold standard and foreign trade 
In Keynes’s model, countries that remedy a lack of domestic demand with an export-oriented 
policy pursue a socially harmful strategy that makes them dependent on foreign fluctuations of 
demand. It means falling into the mercantilist error of pursuing an accumulation of gold as a 
national objective. Under the gold standard, 
 
there was no means open to a government whereby to mitigate 
economic distress at home except through the competitive 
struggle for markets. For all measures helpful to a state of 
chronic or intermittent under-employment were ruled out, except 
measures to improve the balance of trade on income account.” 
(Keynes 1936: 382) 
 
Keynes explained the mercantilist practical aim as being that of increasing the stock of 
gold to let the rate of interest go lower. Outside the gold standard, with central banks empowered 
with interest rate determination, even this justification loses its appeal. While exports, taken 
individually, do reward business, labor, and national excellence, in a macro perspective they 
should always be used to provide room for imports so that a country can transform the real goods 
released abroad into real goods acquired from abroad. Conversely, when exports exceed imports, 
while individual exporters accumulate financial assets abroad, domestic residents reduce real 
consumption. In this way, foreign trade becomes “a desperate expedient to maintain employment 
at home by forcing sales on foreign markets and restricting purchases” (Keynes 1936: 382–383). 
The fact that such strategy requires that other countries pursue an opposite strategy (i.e., they 





On curbing booms 
One popular explanation of output and job declines is that they are the consequence of the 
excessive boom that preceded them. If this is true, the best action to prevent a slump is to curb 
“overinvestment” by timely raising the rate of interest. The question then becomes how to 
measure “overinvestment.” For Keynes, the most appropriate notion of over-investment is “a 
state of affairs where every kind of capital-goods is so abundant that there is no new investment 
which is expected, even in conditions of full employment, to earn in the course of its life more 
than its replacement cost” (Keynes 1936: 320–321, emphasis added). When booms turn into 
slumps, however, we observe a different kind of “overinvestment,” i.e., “investments which are 
destined to disappoint the expectations which prompted them for which there is no use in 
conditions of severe unemployment” (Keynes 1936: 320). Investment booms turn into slumps 
not because the interest rate is too low, but because some investment is misdirected or 
expectations are too buoyant,
2 in which case, and until full employment is reached, interest rates 
(notably, long-term rates) should be lowered before disillusion turns expectations excessively 
pessimistic.  
In Keynes’s model, raising interest rates is a way to overcome the speculative excitement 
and, at the same time, stop every kind of reasonable new investment, an action that “belongs to 
the species of remedy which cures the disease by killing the patient” (Keynes 1936: 323). Thus, 
the “right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us 
permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a 
quasi-boom” (Keynes 1936: 322). 
 
On full employment and financial stability 
A most effective way to end a financial crisis and restore the ability to repay debts is to increase 
employment. Defaults that bring systemic damage are not those coming from frauds and the like. 
Rather, it is the defaults caused by a decline in incomes, cash flows, and available jobs. A strong 
link thus exists between demand, employment, and the financial health of the private sector. In 
this logic, restoring demand and jobs is an effective way to restore the financial soundness of the 
system, preferable to capital transfers and grants to financial institutions under stress. Not only is 
                                                             
2 Keynes was using an adverse selection approach to central bank policy: at higher rates, credit would go to the 
relatively more speculative (risky) projects.  
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unemployment “an absurdity, a confession of failure, and a hopeless and inexcusable breakdown 
of the economic machine” (Keynes 1981: 321), but full employment and the ensuing increase in 
incomes would also increase the number of creditworthy customers seeking funds. 
 
On the desire for financial savings  
This is the core of Keynes’s model, the element that breaks with Ricardian and post-Ricardian 
economics and Say’s law. In a monetary economy, the flow of savings by a private unit is not 
equivalent to future demand. What is not spent today does not entail an order for tomorrow’s 
output. In Keynes’s model, while a single unit’s flow of saving depends on spending decisions 
given income receipts, the total private saving flow is the accounting equivalent of overall 
investment spending, so its total size is not under the control of the savers. The attempt of savers 
to increase their overall saving flow by spending less can only succeed if there is a causal (and 
positive) link between savings and investment. Yet, the link is likely to be a negative one for two 
reasons: first, savings do not provide any net financial means to investors;
3 second, falling orders 
reduce business production plans.
  
So what is to be done if the private sector desires to increase its savings, if the total 
private saving flow is given? Considering macroeconomic flows, there are three possible means 
to accommodate and compensate for a rising desire for savings by the private sector: a rising 
flow of business investment, which could only spark from a spontaneous change in confidence; a 
rising flow of net exports that depends on foreign economic dynamics, which means a surrender 
of sovereignty to the economic and political power of foreign nations; and a rising government 
net deficit. 
This can be expressed in terms of the well-known accounting identity: 
 
S = I + G + X – T – M,          (1) 
 
where the private saving flow (S) is equal to the sum of private investment (I), government 
spending (G), and export receipts (X) minus the sum of taxes paid (T) and import expenses (M). 
While the accounting identity is always true, in Keynes’s interpretation S can only be a residual. 
                                                             
3 A flow-of-funds explanation is given by Terzi (1986).  
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An attempt by private agents to save more results in undesired business inventories (included in 
I) and eventually triggers a reduction of I (and S). An increase in private savings is only healthy 
when it happens along with (and in fact results from) an increase in spending. 
Keynes’s position has time and again been misrepresented as if he was calling for the 
private sector to spend more, even should this entail being uncaring about tomorrow (in the long 
run we are all dead, right?). Rather, he defined the problem of maintaining full employment as 
“the problem of ensuring that the scale of investment should be equal to the savings which may 
be expected to emerge … when employment, and therefore incomes, are at the desired level.” 
(Keynes 1980: 321). Keynes further noted that while business investment is inherently cyclical, 
and net exports cannot be a long-run solution (as above), fiscal policy can play a key function 
here. If the private sector feels its saving flow is too small, a rising government deficit will offset 
the perceived shortage, preventing the attempt to increase savings privately that would result in a 
reduction of the total saving flow. Keynes’s economics does not stand against the notion that 
savings are associated with growth, providing it is understood that “savings for growth” cannot 
be the outcome of a reduction of current private spending, but rather stem from private 
investment or from taxes being lower than government spending.  
 
The relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies  
Business investment is restored when a confident business climate is restored. A variation in the 
rate of interest cannot by itself do it: it will only influence the yield at which investors discount 
their future expected proceeds. For Keynes,  
 
it is not so easy to revive the marginal efficiency of capital, 
determined, as it is, by the uncontrollable and disobedient 
psychology of the business world. It is the return of confidence, 
to speak in ordinary language, which is so insusceptible to control 
in an economy of individualistic capitalism. This is the aspect of 
the slump which bankers and business men have been right in 
emphasizing, and which the economists who have put their faith 
in a “purely monetary” remedy have underestimated. (Keynes 
1936: 317) 
 
Keynes saw a fundamental difference between monetary and fiscal policy: while the 
former modifies the forward price of money (i.e., the rate of interest), the latter modifies  
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disposable incomes and the net worth of the private sector. Government spending and taxing 
flows provide a much more powerful means towards “the task of adjusting to one another the 
propensity to consume and the inducement to invest” (Keynes 1936: 380), so that aggregate 
demand can be kept at the full employment level, preventing both inflation and deflation. This 
policy approach is favorable to peace: “if nations can learn to provide themselves with full 
employment by their domestic policy […] there need be no important economic forces calculated 
to set the interest of one country against that of its neighbors” (Keynes 1936: 382).  
Wrapping up this section, there is strong evidence that the policy regime, both before and 
after the crisis, is largely at variance with Keynes’s policy guidelines. Conventional wisdom in 
policymaking today includes: support of downward price flexibility as a means to restore 
growth;
4 endorsement of export-driven growth strategies;
5 validation of interest rate hikes as a 
means to prevent unsustainable booms;
6 incentives to private savings as a source of finance and 
growth; and a pushing for fiscal policy restraint. On the contrary, Keynes’s view of the path to 
full employment entailed a solid concern about the consequences of deflation, of export-driven 
policies, of raising interest rates too soon, of saving incentives, and of too-timid fiscal policy 
actions. Regarding the latter, governments’ loss of credibility in managing expenses and taxes 
for the public purpose is the result of a lack of leadership with respect to the long views of 
general social advantage. Reducing political sovereignty through “balanced budget 
amendments,” as proposed repeatedly in the United States and practiced in Europe, is not an 
effective answer, and it rather recalls the remedy of curing the disease “by killing the patient,” as 
above. Public deficit reductions intended to restore “fiscal responsibility” indeed lower the 
available savings of the private sector and thus force the adjustment by way of a reduction of 





4 This policy approach is popular in Europe where structural reforms aimed at increasing wage and price flexibility 
are considered key to economic prosperity. 
5 An export-led growth model is fully practiced by the most economically powerful euro member, Germany, and yet, 
this approach is self-defeating as it makes Euroland dependent on foreign business cycles, as well as reinforcing 
divergence and internal deflation (see Bibow [2007] and Flassbeck [2007]). 




3.  FISCAL ACTIONS, SOVEREIGN STATE CURRENCY, AND REAL WEALTH 
 
Having analyzed the distance between Keynes’s policy issues and the current interpretation of 
Keynesian policies as short-run remedies, this section explores the question of fiscal deficit 
financing. This question marks a deep contrast between current new neoclassical synthesis 
interpretations and Keynes’s original model. In the former, because it must be financed with 
either current or future taxes, public deficit can only provide a short-run stimulus to demand, as 
government outlays cannot long exceed receipts without generating rising financing costs and, if 
not timely adjusted, government default. For Keynes, fiscal expansion finds its limit in the 
production possibilities given by the available human and material resources, not in the financing 
constraints of monetary flows. 
The Post Keynesian tradition has powerfully stressed how Keynes’s originality is found 
in his analysis of the market system as a monetary economy where balance sheets and cash flows 
matter. Indeed, following Mankiw’s distinction between scientists and engineers, the major 
shortcomings of today’s mainstream macroeconomics can be found in both the scientists’ neglect 
of money in general equilibrium models, as well as engineers’ misunderstanding of monetary 
flows.  
 
3.1 Where Does the Money Come From? 
A question constantly raised with respect to the anticyclical fiscal packages is “where is the 
money to come from?” The scary answers to this question (such as that Americans borrow from 
China, or that Europeans borrow from their future generations) well-describe the discomfort with 
“short-run fixes”: policies meant to heal the recession are allegedly not sustainable in the long 
run and thus ought to be reversed soon. This concern being based on the “lack of money,” rather 
than of real resources, ignores the legacies of Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes, as I will 
show next. 
An important foundation of economics is the understanding of the difference between 
real and nominal values. On this point, the first lesson is found in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations. For Smith (1979 [1776]), the monetary values that we observe in the market cannot 
measure the real costs of employing real resources to obtain market products. The wealth of a  
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nation is measured not by the value of money, or money in circulation, but by its capacity to 
produce goods and services. It is now a fundamental tenet that only by comparison of monetary 
values we can measure real values: the cost of labor is not the absolute amount of salary paid, but 
is the salary paid compared to the value of the product made possible by that labor; the price of 
something is not its price in absolute amount of units, but its relative price in terms of another 
product; the value of output over time cannot be compared with absolute values, but with 
deflated values, etc. Smith’s lesson is that the real wealth of a nation can only be measured after 
removing the veil of money—it consists of the material and human resources available at any 
given time. 
The second important lesson on the difference between real and nominal values is found 
in Keynes’s General Theory. Keynes stresses that only monetary returns prove the success or 
failure of economic decisions in a monetary economy, and agents make decisions on the basis of 
expectations of monetary flows. Agents’ awareness of future possible surprises when making 
decisions under ontological uncertainty (see Terzi [2010]) affects their behavior. Most 
fundamentally, this induces them to storing part of their wealth in a liquid form (financial 
savings) as a way to keep options open, storing the power to make payments until an undefined 
future date. Actual and expected monetary flows thus shape economic outcomes and can place a 
more stringent constraint on output than the available real resources. 
The views of Smith and Keynes are sometimes erroneously represented as conflicting, 
yet are quite complementary. When considered jointly, they teach us how to truly avoid money 
illusion in our interpretation of the world. From Smith, we learn that production and employment 
are only limited by national resources. Thus, in the hardship of postwar reconstruction or 
postcrisis recovery, a nation faces no real constraint other than the full employment of its 
existing resources. From Keynes, we learn that the desire for financial savings is both reasonable 
(for individuals—at the micro level—because it meets the desire to tame uncertainty) and 
problematic (for the nation—at the macro level—because it removes demand and production 
incentives), and is likely to add a monetary constraint to output and employment. 
Keynes never confused money with real values: as long as we have unused resources, 
prosperity is “around the corner,” but cannot be attained until we remove the monetary 
constraint. He offered an excellent discussion of this in his 1940s analysis of the economic 
challenge facing Britain and the world. At the time of Britain’s gigantic spending effort for  
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postwar reconstruction, Keynes was faced precisely with this question: where is the money to 
come from? To this he answered in truly Smithian style: the wealth of a nation is not its money; 
it is the “bricks and mortar and steel and concrete and labor and architects” (Keynes 1980: 308).  
Yet, Keynes was well aware of how deeply engrained the belief was (and, alas, still is) 
that money is a constraint—not only for the individual, but for the nation as well—as if money 
had to be considered a real asset that the nation may or may not possess, while this was clearly 
no longer the case after the end of the gold standard. Indeed, Keynes’s answer to the question 
“where is the money to come from?” entails that money is a social object, a nonconvertible credit 
of the nation state.  
This means that no run on the central bank, or the government, is logically possible, 
unless the nation for some reason imposes on itself an obligation of guaranteeing the national 
money with some other real asset (or somebody else’s credit). A community that aspires to 
maximizing its overall welfare should use money as an instrument, not as a restraint. While the 
gold standard introduces the artificial constraint of the existing stock of gold available, in an 
economy where the state issues money without any promise of conversion into anything else 
than state currency itself,
7 the only constraint that matters, in the short or long run, is the limit of 
available real resources. Yet, the economy may fall short of reaching that limit when policy 
actions are ineffective in removing the monetary constraint, thus causing what Keynes 
considered the most urgent question economics should address: “a condition where there is a 
shortage of houses, but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in the houses that there are.” 
In other words, a monetary economy may generate a “poverty in the midst of plenty” situation 
where agents cannot achieve their production possibilities because of a monetary obstacle that 
prevents them from fully using the existing resources of the nation. 
At the time Keynes was engaged in this discussion, Abba Lerner (1943) had just written 
an excellent piece on the logic and the reality of the constraint of feeding the economy with 
public spending or tax cuts. In a letter to James Meade, discussing the use of fiscal policy to 
maintain full employment, Keynes claims to be in agreement with Lerner’s notion that deficit 
spending is only limited by real resources. Keynes writes a revealing comment in this regard: 
“Lerner’s argument is impeccable. But, heaven help anyone who tries to put it across the plain 
                                                             
7 This is “sovereign money” in the sense of Wray (2003).  
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man at this stage of the evolution of ideas” (Keynes 1980: 320). Keynes was quite aware that the 
true nature of money outside the gold standard, or any other self-imposed constraint, can be 
politically scary, and should be handled with great care. Nevertheless, he was quite clear in his 
comments on budgetary considerations about how to create employment in postwar Britain: 
 
The Committee give the impression that, whilst the measures 
they propose to avoid unemployment are admittedly necessary 
and advisable, a price has to be paid for them in the shape of 
budgetary deficits and perhaps a consequent weakening in 
international confidence in our position. Exactly the opposite is 
the truth… Is it supposed that slumps increase the national 
wealth? … How slow dies the inbred fallacy that it is an act of 
financial imprudence to put men to work! (Keynes 1980: 366–
367) 
 
The challenge to the dominant views on money was the most controversial aspect of 
Keynes’s theory. Although dismissed by the IS-LM Keynesians, this has been the major thrust of 
Post Keynesian scholars.
8 More recently, in several path-breaking papers, Warren Mosler
9 has 
tirelessly contended that all we need to conquer unemployment and inflation is to properly 
understand how our monetary system works. Once we master it, the limit to fiscal deficits clearly 
appears to be nothing else than what is required to achieve full employment and price stability.  
If a market system is compatible with full employment and sustainable growth, why do 
we have so little of these? Keynes believed in the power of ideas. One wonders, however, to 
what extent it is a matter of logic, and to what extent it is a question of lack of political 
willingness to create a sustainable full employment society, where the raising of human dignity 
may well produce social consequences that specific powerful constituencies would rather shun. 
By the same token, one cannot expect to overcome the political obstacles until the principle is 
accepted as a matter of logic. What follows is a simple flow-of-funds framework aimed at 
clarifying some fundamental relations between the private and the public sector when the latter is 
the monopolist supplier of currency, whose supply is unconstrained.  
                                                             
8 Notably, Paul Davidson (1972) and Hyman Minsky (1975). 
9 Cfr. Mosler (1997 and 2010).  
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3.2 A Private Sector-Public Sector Flow-of-funds Model 
Both Lerner and Keynes claimed that the public sector has, outside the gold standard, the power 
to impose, or remove, the monetary constraint to growth. This can best be seen by moving the 
focus from the notion of savings to that of financial savings of the private sector. Reconsidering 
(1) above, it can be seen that the total private flow of savings consists of a real and a financial 
component. While the value of investment (I) reflects the accumulation of private real assets, the 
difference between government spending and tax receipts (G − T) reflects a change in private 
holdings of financial assets: 
 
G − T = ∆ private sector’s holdings of government liabilities.    (2) 
 
Similarly, the trade balance (X − M) reflects a change in private (domestic) net holdings of 
financial assets abroad: 
 
X − M = ∆ private sector’s holdings of net assets abroad.      (3) 
 
Thus, using (2) and (3) into (1) above, 
 
S = I + ∆ private sector’s holdings of government liabilities + ∆ private sector’s 
holdings  of  net  assets  abroad.        (4) 
 
The real component of savings (I) for the private sector is the outcome of the accounting 
definition of investment goods. Because investment spending is recorded in the capital (not the 
current) account, an equivalent amount of savings is generated as a matter of accounting.
10 These 
savings exist in the stock of investment goods produced, and do not provide the private sector 
with a net acquisition of financial wealth: the financial savings of “surplus” units is perfectly 
offset by the financial dissavings of “deficit” units and the net financial savings of the 
consolidated private sector is zero. 
                                                             
10 Should a category of goods be redefined as investment instead of consumption, total private savings would pari 
passu increase. Total private savings is purely definitional (cfr. Terzi [1986]).  
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The other two components of total private savings include the net acquisition of public 
sector liabilities and the net acquisition of foreign sector liabilities. Both provide the private 
sector with a net flow of financial assets. Thus, the desire of the private sector for a positive 
inflow of financial assets can only be fulfilled by either a government deficit or a trade surplus 
(or a combination). If it is fulfilled by a government deficit, no change in real wealth follows; 
only a change in accounting entries between the issuer and the users of money. If, instead, the 
desire for financial savings is fulfilled by a trade surplus, then the net acquisition of financial 
assets by the private sector is offset, dollar-for-dollar, by a reduction of the goods and services 
owned by the domestic private sector. Thus, it is only the public sector that can bring about a net 
increase in private sector’s financial wealth without requiring a loss of real wealth. 
To illustrate these points, a simple flow-of-funds model is considered here. It shows 
intersectoral flows between a private sector consolidating households, business firms, and banks 
(i.e., the currency using sector) and a public sector consolidating all government agencies, 
including the central bank (i.e., the currency issuing sector).
11 It is assumed that the public sector 
acquires the goods and services it needs to operate by making payments to the private sector in 
the form of a credit of the central bank (currency), and that the private sector is requested to 
make tax payments in the same form of central bank credit. It is further assumed that central 
bank credit is not pegged to the value of any real asset or foreign currency, and can be issued at 
will by the public sector that functions as the currency monopolist of the nation. This means that 
the public sector is assumed to possess monetary sovereignty, i.e., its liabilities are accepted as 
tax-credit units and are issued without prior need of real resources.
12  
In table 1, the private sector’s total payments include private spending on consumption 
and investment (C + I) and tax payments to government (T); the private sector’s total receipts 
include private spending (C + I) and government spending (G).
13 Each sector’s net financial 
savings, like in any flow-of-funds account, is the difference between total (nonfinancial) receipts 
and total (nonfinancial) payments. If such difference is positive, that sector is acquiring net 
financial savings. 
                                                             
11 Consolidation of the Treasury and the central bank is legitimate if we consider they both pursue public purpose, 
though may appear heretical to the theorists of central bank independence. 
12 This also entails that the risk that the public sector be unable (as distinct from unwilling) to pay off its liabilities in 
units of state currency is zero. 
13 Notice that the difference between consumption and investment spending is irrelevant in what follows (and, 
consequently, so is S).  
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If G and T are both zero or, alternatively, if they are equal in amount, then the (annual) 
flow of the private sector’s net financial savings must be zero. In such case, as above, any 
financial savings generated by one member of the private sector is perfectly offset, as a matter of 
accounting, by financial dissavings of another member of the same sector. 
It follows that the private sector is in a position to increase its net financial savings only 
when, by interacting with another sector, its consolidated receipts are greater than its 
consolidated payments. When the “other” sector is the public sector, this happens when 
government spending exceeds taxes: fiscal deficits produce private financial savings.
14 
 











For the sake of illustration, and because this is the most common situation, it is assumed 
that the net financial savings of the public sector (T – G ) is negative. Thus, the private sector’s 
net financial savings are positive, and they must take the form of a liability issued by the public 
sector: bank reserves, cash, or Treasury securities.
15 Table 2 shows how each sector’s net 
financial savings must equal the acquisitions of financial assets less the additions to liabilities.  
When the public sector makes its payments, this is in the form of bank reserves (R), i.e., 
the central bank credit that functions as “currency.” To the extent that the private sector has a 
preference for holding some banknotes and coins, a fraction of bank reserves will be converted 
                                                             
14 The only logical alternative is when the domestic private sector net receives from a foreign private sector more 
than it net spends (i.e., runs a trade surplus). In this case, again, the savings of one country are offset by the 
dissavings of another. For the world, only the public sector can generate net savings to the world private sector. 
15 It cannot be held in the form of bank deposits, as deposits are both an asset and a liability of the private sector.  
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into cash in circulation (C). Notice that if the public sector issues no additional Treasuries, all the 
private sector’s net financial savings are held in either cash or bank reserves, depending on 
private sector’s preferences (for holding banknotes and coins), and thus the excess reserve 
condition in the banking system will send the interbank interest rate to zero.
16 The issue of 
Treasuries (B)—net of loans of the public sector (L)—has only the function of replacing reserves 
(assuming an unchanged private sector’s preference for cash): by offering an interest-bearing 
asset, the public sector raises the interbank interest rate above zero. The central bank can then 
fine tune the interbank interest rate by engaging in open market operations: using Treasuries in 
circulation, it can set interest rates (i.e., the ask and the bid intertemporal price of money). 
Central bank operations can only substitute one financial asset for another and thus have no 
power to influence the private sector’s net financial savings. 
 











From this perspective, Keynes’s theory of effective demand can be read as follows: 
Anytime the private sector attempts to increase its financial savings, unemployment will climb 
unless the public sector is ready to provide additional financial savings through its fiscal deficit. 
It is thus an option for the public sector to inject a sufficient amount of financial savings to meet 
the demand of the private sector, until aggregate demand has reached the level that generates full 
employment. The public sector can only do this by means of its taxing and spending powers that 
directly modify private net financial savings. Monetary policy operations, such as central bank 
                                                             
16 This assumes no interest on bank reserves is paid. For more on this see Fullwiler (2007).  
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lending (L) or “open market operations” (modifying the relative components of R and B in the 
private sector’s portfolio) have no effect.
17 
In the flow-of-funds framework developed above, public spending is not limited by the 
financial resources of the public sector (taxes) or of the private sector (state borrowing against 
future taxes). To the contrary, the ability of the private sector to pay taxes and acquire 
government bonds is made possible by the public sector running a deficit by issuing central bank 
credit.  
Fiscal sustainability means that fiscal measures must provide the private sector with a 
sufficient amount of financial savings, and the size of the deficit should only be constrained by 
full employment. An excess injection of savings should be avoided to prevent a situation where 
the private sector’s attempt to reduce its savings will cause aggregate demand to exceed available 
resources and cause inflation. Until then, no other monetary constraint should act as an obstacle 
to the full employment of real resources. 
Tables 3 and 4 introduce a further distinction within the private sector between domestic 
and foreign residents. While table 3 illustrates how net exports (X – M) produce net financial 
savings for the domestic private sector, in addition to government deficit, table 4 shows how net 
exports equal the increase of deposits held abroad (DA) net of domestic deposits owned by 
foreigners (DF).
18 Keynes’s characterization of net exports as a “desperate expedient” can be 
read as follows: For any period when the private sector sells abroad more than it buys from 
abroad, the resulting increase in financial savings in the form of credits with foreign institutions 
(thus not exempt from exchange rate or default risk) is offset by a loss of output available for 
residents (i.e., the goods and the services delivered abroad). As stated above, only the public 
sector has the power to create net financial wealth without loss of real national wealth. By the 
same token, government creation of financial wealth does not necessarily create real wealth. This 
should call for the government to carefully regulate its deficit size: net private financial savings 
may be too low for unemployment or be too high for price stability.
19 
                                                             
17 Interest rates on government bonds, however, affect private sector’s incomes from holding Treasuries, and thus G. 
18 For simplicity, it is here assumed that foreigners do not acquire bonds.  
19 These considerations about deficit size abstract from other important issues in fiscal policy, including the 
consequences of different tax systems upon income distribution and inflation, and of the quality of public spending 
and its impact on national real wealth. Discussion of these issues is not this paper’s objective, and yet this paper 










(1) Total payments  C + I + T + M  X  G  
(2) Total receipts   C + I + G + X   M   T  
Net financial savings = (2) – (1)   (G – T) + (X – M)  M – X  T ­ G 
 






Net financial savings = (3) – (4)   (G – T) + (X – M)  M – X  T – G 
(3) Acquisitions of financial assets   R + C + B + DA   DF  L 
(4) Additions to liabilities  L + DF  DA   R + C + B 
 
In conclusion, when fiscal deficits are unconstrained by the use of sovereign state 
currency, it will always be possible to generate a sufficient flow of private financial savings that 
equals the amount desired when incomes and employment are at the target level. The size of 
fiscal deficit is, in this sense, purely instrumental and “functional” to any given target for the 
level of economic activity. Thus, there is no obstacle to full employment, providing that no 
artificial limits on government deficits are imposed. Such limits can only result from self-
imposed rules, such as setting the domestic currency at par with a foreign asset or checking 
government power to issue central bank credit when needed. Any self-imposed limit to (G – T) 





4.   THE INSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EURO PROJECT 
 
The previous section’s investigation of the causes and consequences of the creation of public 
sector liabilities illustrates Keynes’s (and Lerner’s) policy approach to removing all monetary 
constraints to demand, employment, and growth, as only real constraints should matter. This can 
be a lesson to current concerns about fiscal solvency. As Lerner put it, 
 
No government will be able to sit back and wait for the degree 
of unemployment which will result in the degree of price fall 
that will create enough idle money to induce sufficient private 
investment to start a movement back to prosperity. The New 
Deal and the war prosperity will have shown enough people that 
serious depression is dispensable. Some form of functional 
finance will in fact be practiced by whatever government we 
have. The only danger is that it will be too little and too late. 
(Lerner 1947: 315) 
 
Indeed, with the global recession, one problem common to a number of countries is that 
discretionary increases in fiscal deficits have not been enacted rapidly and have been too timid. 
One obvious example is the euro area where, absent any significant effort to intentionally 
increase the deficit of the public sectors, a fiscal crisis has been mounting, first with the 
worldwide financial crisis of 2007–08,
20 and then with the consequence of the economic crisis of 
2009–10 when automatic stabilizers drove fiscal deficits to break the upper limits set by fiscal 
coordination. This final section provides an assessment of monetary arrangements in the euro 
area where institutional constraints to the supply of central bank credit have reintroduced 
national solvency risks, typical of the gold standard. It concludes that, absent an effective change 
in its monetary operations, the euro area is facing a deflationary tendency that makes it, as 
feared, a very precarious economic region in the world economy today.  
 
4.1 The Euro Conceived as a State-of-the-art Disciplining Tool 
The euro was conceived within the institutional and political construction of the European 
Union, where nation-states have, in the course of the past half-century, dramatically increased 
their degree of pooled sovereignty, though still upholding some key aspects of national 
                                                             
20 Cfr. Kelton and Wray (2009)  
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sovereignty, notably their tax-and-spend authority. Within this broader project, the common 
currency offered additional scope for shared governance. 
Yet, the act of moving to a single, pooled currency was differently appealing to the actors 
involved. In the Europeanist view, it was a way to foster the identity of Europe and accelerate the 
political integration process for this to include other dimensions of shared sovereignty, such as 
security, foreign policy, fiscal authority, and macroeconomic governance.  
In another view, call it the “virtuous currency view,” it was primarily a way to create a 
shared, sound currency. Quite apart from the time required to extend political integration, and 
indeed even in case of no further political integration to be seen soon, the European single 
currency was meant, by and of itself, to reduce transactions costs and create a more 
homogeneous area, by eliminating intra-European foreign exchange, creating a single banking 
payment system (thus also removing intra-European foreign exchange settlement risk), and 
eliminating exchange exposure, thus creating the necessary (though not sufficient) monetary 
conditions for a true single market where companies could do business on a larger scale, with 
both micro- and macro-economic benefits to Europeans. 
The virtuous currency approach was the one that dominated the preparation, the creation, 
and the management of the European single currency area. While the Europeanist approach was 
rooted within a broader design and a political agenda where the common currency was a motor 
of political integration, the “virtuous currency” project was considered similar to the adoption of 
a superior technology, a means to acquire monetary stability and lay out one condition to 
economic success of the monetary union. The chosen path of aiming, primarily, at a “sound” 
currency acquired a broad consensus. It was perceived as more robust, because it did not seem to 
require a quick move towards greater political integration, and it would not suffer if this latter 
process would come to a standstill. 
The idea of creating a state-of-the-art monetary system was appealing even to those who 
had initially supported a more politically oriented process. Indeed, most Europeanists favored 
this strategy as a means to consolidate one significant accomplishment that would remain even in 
the face of future setbacks of the integration process. To be the golden apple of Europeans, the 
new currency had to be not politically powerful, but rather technically sound.  
This outcome of monetary integration in Europe can be seen as a compromise between 
Hayek’s denationalized, private, competitive money and the traditional state monopoly assigned  
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to the chartered central bank: the new currency was denationalized, yet not private; it was 
ultimately public, though chartered by a supranational treaty. All sound principles were spelled 
out in the treaty and adherence to the sound principles would allegedly deliver the sound 
currency that Europeans had been dreaming of.  
The objection that countries, both individually and as a community, would lose their 
macroeconomic stabilization policy tools was countered by theories claiming that structural 
policies sponsoring market integration, market competition, and labor market flexibility would 
suffice to free up the potential of the newly created region. This would be encouraged by 
commonly agreed prescriptions, but ultimately left to a competitive process of individual nations. 
With regards to demand-side conditions, these would be monitored by the central bank in such a 
way so as to achieve price stability and thus provide a proper environment and a further stimulus 
for the growth process to unfold in the new single market. 
Equipped in this way, the new pooled currency of Europeans was meant to deliver 
“perfect money” that needed no gold, no state, and could become a template for other shared 
currencies in other world regions. The “golden apple” had become the long-waited 
accomplishment that would, by and of itself, strengthen the course of European integration. The 
quality of the new currency would work as an “attractor,” something European countries would 
find it in their interest to adopt.  
Within this approach, the euro has been safeguarded from governments’ threats to its 
“integrity,” including fiscal “discipline” aimed to preventing a situation where “excessive” 
deficits undermine the soundness of the euro. Deficits are considered harmful, as they allegedly 
absorb union’s financial resources and raise interest rates, thus raising financing costs for all 
private investment in the union, and ultimately interfering with monetary policy. 
In the light of the flow-of-funds framework developed above, however, it is dramatically 
inaccurate to describe public deficits as effectively absorbing financial resources. Indeed, as a 
matter of accounting, deficit spending by any economic sector—private or public—generates a 
positive net financial balance elsewhere; public deficits (unless the state currency is pegged to a 
real asset such as gold) do not absorb real resources, but have the power to accommodate the 
private desire for financial savings.
21 
                                                             
21 Virtually every macro textbook shows how a government deficit (G – T) must be offset by an excess of saving  
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4.2 The Euro Ailing from Too Much Virtue 
It turns out that “disanchoring” the European currency from the nation states without creating a 
federal fiscal authority resulted in a gigantic risk, measured by governments’ loss of monetary 
sovereignty in the same manner as a dollarized country.
22 The sovereign debt crisis of Greece has 
been a consequence of such institutional construction, and yet the political reaction in Europe is 
not challenging the “virtuous currency” fancy. The European Commission has claimed that 
Europe needs to strengthen its discipline and reinforce the compliance with common (fixed) 
fiscal rules, as if the euro were not virtuous enough in spite of all efforts. Yet, reality is different, 
and the problems of the euro should be found precisely in the mistaken attempts of making it a 
“virtuous” currency.  
Two elements, meant to build its “virtue,” need attention, as each creates risks even when 
one assumes that all member nations diligently make their best efforts to comply with fiscal 
rules. First, the agreed limits on deficits have been fixed in a set of cast-iron figures that have no 
theoretical foundation
23 and do not contemplate changing cyclical conditions (i.e., the 
“outstanding” feature of the large swings of economic activity that Keynes had stressed long 
ago). This undermines the ability of Europeans to use fiscal policies to the same degree as when 
they had retained monetary sovereignty.
24  
The other element is governments’ loss of monetary sovereignty without a higher, federal 
level acquiring it, thus creating a fundamental financial distress at the highest level of monetary 
hierarchy. On the one hand, when European deficits increase as a result of either governments 
actively breaching the rules or of automatic stabilizers during recessions, an injection of financial 
savings takes place in the form of cash, reserves, and Treasuries, as illustrated in the previous 
section. On the other hand, the Treasury component (B) in private portfolios becomes subject to 
credit risk, as member nations, just like states in the United States, cannot use central bank credit 
as needed to settle payments and may thus default on debt. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
overinvestment (S – I) in the private sector. What the same textbooks often fail to stress is how such excess saving 
disappears if the deficit is eliminated, and they often convey the totally unwarranted notion that those excess 
savings, if not absorbed by public deficits, could be differently (and perhaps better) be employed. 
22 Goodhart (1998) had seen this risk coming. 
23 Cfr. Pasinetti (1998) 
24 This approach is of course consistent with the notion of fiscal policy ineffectiveness in the “new neoclassical 




The combined outcome of these two components of euro “virtue” is that when fiscal 
deficits increase on a cyclical slowdown, governments are forced to undertake procyclical 
policies; if growth does not pick up soon enough, and widening deficits scare financial markets, 
interest rates rise, reflecting default risk. The level of private sector’s savings can thus only be 
restored through net exports or a sufficiently large output drop. This leaves two options for 
generating the financial savings that the public sector cannot provide: pursue an export-driven 
growth model or, when exports falter, accept straight deflation. 
Notice that the fiscal crisis in the euro area has been, at least temporarily, halted with the 
controversial decision of the European Central Bank to organize purchases of national 
government debt. By engaging in monetary operations that facilitate national solvency, in spite 
of the rhetoric of strengthening rules, the euro area has found a way of surviving by precisely 
reducing the alleged “virtue” of its currency. The future of the euro area is likely to depend on 
whether the attempts to fully restore its (harmful) virtues or the efforts to establish central 
(federal?) macroeconomic governance will prevail. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The political emergency sparked by the crisis has forced governments to choose actions that 
mainstream economists do not consider sound in the long run. They agreed that the problem is a 
lack of demand and accepted the “Keynesian moment” as the only game in town. Government 
interference with banks’ balance sheets and expansionary fiscal policy were justified by the 
urgency of rescuing the system from meltdown and the need to kick-start the economy. 
As deficits grow, pressure rises in the United States for taking deficit-reducing actions 
that prevent a “fiscal crisis.” In the euro area, this pressure is institutionalized, as deliberate fiscal 
policy to accommodate the private sector’s desire for financial savings is not an option, absent a 







This paper has provided evidence that:  
1)  The prevailing policy regime, both before and after the crisis, is largely at variance with 
Keynes’s policy guidelines and, more importantly, it is doomed to be ineffective if the 
degree of tolerance of fiscal deficits is too low for full employment; 
2)  Private financial resources are a consequence, not a condition, of government deficits. 
Indeed, the truly distinctive point on this matter made by Keynes, following Smith, is that 
the limit to aggregate spending is set by real, not financial, resources; and 
3)  The euro area offers an example of a self-constrained approach to fiscal policy where the 
aim at a virtuous currency has backfired.  
 
If the analysis of the relation between fiscal deficits and financial savings discussed 
above is correct, then governments have a real option to choose for or against full employment. 
The global crisis may thus become a turning point, in that those countries that will boldly use 
fiscal actions as a means to prosperity will find a way to strengthen their economic welfare, 
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